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cause of action arisen in the state court. This problem was
avoided by lower federal courts in Sampson v. ChanneJl"4 and
New Englnt Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence.60 In those cases
the federal courts had opportunity to consider the point at issue
as falling into one of several possible categories, which could be
governed by different conflict of laws rules; the methods and
rules by which courts deal with such situations are technically
known as "qualification." In the cases just referred to, the courts
applied state rules to the points in issue, which rules were prop-
erly applicable after the qualification had been made. In the
Griffin case and in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,°0 de-
cided the same day, the problems did not lend themselves to quali-
fication and in each instance the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the district court with instructions that the state law be
found and applied. In formulating and applying a conflict of
laws rule a state court must not violate provisions of the federal
Constitution; federal courts, applying state law, under the rule
of the Erie case, may not apply even theretofore accepted state
rules if the latter would violate the Constitution. It is for this
reason that the dicta in the Griffin case, relating to the consti-
tutional scope of Texas rules of public policy, are of great im-
portance even though the narrow decision was that the district
court must, under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins7 ascertain the scope
of the Texas rule of public policy.
HoRAcE S. HASELTINE.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE N. L. R. A.
1. INTRODUCTION
(a) The Problem
There are few phrases in the parlance of democracy which
are surrounded with such an aura of sanctity as that which en-
velops the phrase "freedom of speech." And, of course, the wis-
dom of so regarding it has long since been removed from the field
of debate. However, conceding the wisdom, and in fact the abso-
lute necessity, of preserving to the utmost degree the integrity
of freedom of speech, there remains the task of definition. Ordi-
narily, we experience no difficulty in determining when freedom
of speech has been denied. The history books abound with ex-
64. (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 754, noted in (1941) 26 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QUARTERLY 244.
65. (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 665.
66. (1941) 313 U. S. 487.
67. (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487.
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amples. Modern industrial conditions, however, give rise to prob-
lems for the solution of which the history books are of no great
assistance. There are new factors complicating the problem
which make it difficult to tell at a glance whether or not the issue
of freedom of speech is really involved, at all. Such a situation
is presented by the enforcement of the National Labor Relations
Act. In that act, Congress announced the policy of protecting
and encouraging labor organization. Employers have found
themselves accused of running afoul of the law when the basis
of their objectionable conduct is not an act, but an utterance.'
Immediately the issue of freedom of speech rushes to the fore,
accompanied by the violent protestation of employers. It is the
purpose of this note to consider whether employers are justified
in their protests, or whether they are attempting to take advan-
tage of the sacred phrase "freedom of speech" by applying it
to a situation where it does not and was never meant to fit.
(b) The Nature of Freedom of Speech
In the consideration of this problem, an understanding of the
philosophical background of the doctrine of freedom of speech
is indispensable. John Milton, in his immortal Areopagitica, pre-
sented the case for freedom of speech:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously
by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let
her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?
This concise statement is the complete philosophical basis for
freedom of speech. The same idea has been put forth many times
since Milton's day, without improvement, but with equal con-
viction. Mr. Justice Holmes applied the idea to American democ-
racy, saying:
* * * when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
1. For recent discussions of this topic see: Killingsworth, Employer
Freedom of Speech and the N. L. R. B. (1941) Wis. L. Rev. 211; Van
Dusen, Free Speech and the National Labor Relations Act (1940) 35 Ill.
L. Rev. 409; Free Speech and the Ford Case (1940--Summer) Bill of Rights
Review 44.
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can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.2
More recently, Justice Stone, now Chief Justice, put the same
thought into these words:
Those who won our independence had confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of
ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.
Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their
evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free
discussion.3
From these statements it is at once evident that freedom of
speech is not advocated because of any inherent divinity in its
nature. It is advocated because it is believed by the advocates to
be the best method of achieving certain desired results. Free-
dom of speech has a purpose and exists only in relation to its
purpose. Its purpose is to provide for something in the nature
of a process of intellectual natural selection, to borrow terminol-
ogy; by virtue of its ability to produce from a given number of
opinions and ideas the best ones for our use, it enables us to
make informed judgments as to what concerns us, to our greatest
benefit.
Consequently, since freedom of speech has a purpose, it fol-
lows that it is qualified by that purpose. Therefore, when the
purpose of an utterance is other than that which has been as-
cribed to free utterances, it may be restricted. In Abrams v.
United States4 Holmes acknowledged this qualifying element in
the statement that when " * * they [expressions of opinions]
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country," then they may be checked. Stone,
in Thornhill v. AlabamW said that abridgment of the liberty of
discussion could be justified "where the clear danger of sub-
stantive evils arises under circumstances affording no oppor-
tunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion." Few principles of constitu-
tional law are as well-established as the principle that freedom
of speech is a qualified, not an absolute, righte Certainly no one
2. Abrams v. U. S. (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 630.
3. Thornhill v. Alabama (1939) 310 U. S. 88, 95.
4. 250 U. S. 616, 630.
5. 310 U. S. 88, 104.
6. 2 Story's Commentas oan the Constitution (5th ed. 1891) §1180, 634;
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free.Speech in the United States (1941) 8; Robert-
son v. Baldwin (1897) 165 U. S. 275; Brown v. Walker (1895) 161 U. S.
591; United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U. S. 662.
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will deny that freedom of speech does not protect a man from
penalty for falsely shouting, "fire!" in a theatre and causing
panic ;7 nor will there be any disagreement that to make criminal
the counselling of murder is constitutional For the rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment, fundamental and basic though
they be, are not more sacred than any other rights granted by
the Constitution." The discovery and spread of truth on subjects
of general concern is one of the most important purposes of
society and government. But there are other purposes of society
and government, and unlimited discussion may interfere with
these purposes. Therefore, the contrary purposes must be bal-
anced against each other.10 And although freedom of speech must
weigh heavily, there are instances wherein it must be overbal-
anced. Again in the words of Holmes, when "words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent,".' they may be re-
stricted. This rule is a rule of reason, and when correctly applied
it will preserve the right of free speech "both from suppression
by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from abuse by irre-
sponsible, fanatical minorities."'1 2 But without the limitation of
this rule, said Story, "it [freedom of speech] might become the
scourge of the republic, first denouncing the principles of liberty,
and then, by rendering the most virtuous patriots odious through
the terrors of the press, introducing despotism in its worst
form."
8
(c) The Problem in Reverse
This problem, then, of the limitations upon freedom of speech,
was old before the Wagner Act was conceived. Moreover, the
problem as applied to labor disputes is by no means novel to the
Wagner Act. But in past years, in an era of less social conscious-
ness, it was the employee, and not the employer who was the
aggrieved party. Courts found no particular difficulty in decid-
ing whether or not utterances and expressions made by labor
unions were illegal. At least one court, enjoining a union from
7. Schenck v. U. S. (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
8. Frohwerk v. U. S. (1919) 249 U. S. 204.
9. John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill (Wis. 1932) 242 N. W. 576.
10. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 6, at 31.
11. Schenck v. U. S. (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 52; see also Whitney v. People
of the State of California (1926) 274 U. S. 356, 357.
12. Schaeffer v. U. S. (1920) 251 U. S. 466, 482, dissent by Holmes and
Brandeis.
18. 2 Story's Commentaries on the Constitution (5th ed. 1891) §1180,
684.
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the publication and use of letters, circulars, and other printed
matter being used as a means for carrying on an unlawful boy-
cott, has maintained that there was no question of freedom of
speech involved. 4 "We don't patronize" and "unfair dealer" lists
have been similarly treated, without even the mention of the issue
of freedom of speech. 5 A labor leader was prohibited from ad-
vocating a general strike "by persuasion, force or violence.'"
In the classic Hitchr/m Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell case, 7 the
Supreme Court of the United States enjoined labor unions from
"inducing or seeking to induce" employees to violate non-union
contracts of employment by joining the union; and not only was
this conduct by labor held unlawful, but it was denounced as
malicious.
Picketing, the labor union's method of speech, its device for
informing the public of its side of the controversy, has received
similar treatment. A circuit court has held that "There is and
can be no such thing as peaceful picketing," that "a peaceful,
law-abiding man can be and is intimidated * * * [by being]
compelled to pass by men known to be unfriendly."' 8 Another
court reached the same result in announcing that picketing would
intimidate a timid man as certainly as physical assault, and would
be restrained by injunction.19 Unfortunately, not all of the cases
suppressing this fundamental right of labor occurred during days
of relative antiquity. In comparatively recent times, the picket-
ing of a theatre, peacefully, causing substantial reduction in the
employer's business, has been enjoined.20 A New Jersey case held
that the assemblage of a large number of pickets in the vicinity
of the place of business of the employer in the furtherance of
a strike was a private nuisance which not only would be enjoined,
but which the legislature was powerless to legalize, since picket-
ing in its mildest form was a nuisance.2' The same court in an-
other case announced that peaceful picketing was a contradiction
in terms, picketing being "militant both in character and pur-
pose. 2 2 The United States Supreme Court once declared that
14. Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 418.
15. Lawlor v. Loewe (1915) 235 U. S. 522.
16. In re Debs (1895) 158 U. S. 564.
17. (1917) 245 U. S. 229.
18. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee (C. C. S. D. Ia. E. D. 1905)
139 Fed. 582.
19. Kolley v. Robinson (C. C. A. 8, 1911) 187 Fed. 415.
20. Bull v. Internat'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Mach. Operators (1925) 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459.
21. T. Lichtman & Sons v. Leather Workers' Industrial Union (1933)
114 N. J. Eq. 596, 169 Atl. 498.
22. Elkind & Sons v. Retail Clerks International Protective Ass'n (1933)
114 N. J. Eq. 586, 169 Atl. 494.
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four to twelve pickets in a group constituted intimidation per
88.2S
2. INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBLEM BY THE NLRB
Today, however, it is the employers who complain of the inva-
sion of their constitutional rights. The basis for the restrictions
complained of is in section 8 (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: 2 4
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1)
To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.25
In its approach to the proper interpretation of this section with
reference to the problem of freedom of speech, the Board had the
benefit of some court decisions concerning a similar provision of
the Railway Labor Act :26 "Representatives for the purposes of
this Act, shall be designated by the respective parties * * * with-
out interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party
over the self-organization or designation of representatives by
the other." The Supreme Court, in an early decision,27 laid down
a standard for the interpretation of the section. "'Interference'
with freedom of action and 'coercion' refer to well understood
concepts of the law." In the interpretation of the word "influ-
ence" the court maintained that "The use of the word is not to
be taken as interdicting the normal relations and innocent com-
munications which are a part of all friendly intercourse, albeit
between employer and employee. 'Influence' in this context
plainly means pressure, the use of the authority or power of
either party to induce action by the other in derogation of what
the statute calls 'self-organization'." The court concluded opti-
mistically with the thought that it was quite a simple matter to
appraise such questionable conduct as would fall within the com-
pass of the act.
Nevertheless, the decision has been of little help in deciding
whether an employer's utterance is "influence" or "pressure" or
23. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council (1921)
257 U. S. 184.
24. (1935) 49 Stat. 452, c. 372; 29 U. S. C. A. §158.
25. Section 7 is as follows: "Employees shall have the right to self
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection."
26. (1926) 44 stat. 577, c. 347, §2(3); 45 U. S. C. A. §151.
27. Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks
(1930) 281 U. S. 548.
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the "use of authority." In a later circuit court of appeals case,28
the problem was found bothersome. By way of dictum, the court
said:
It must be remembered in this connection * * * that any
sort of influence exerted by an employer upon an employee,
dependent upon his employment for means of livelihood may
very easily become undue, in that it will coerce the employ-
ee's will in favor of what the employer desires against his
better judgment as to what is really in the best interest of
himself and his fellow employees.
If the National Labor Relations Board looked to the interpreta-
tion of the Railway Labor Act for guidance, it could not have
helped being impressed more by this dictum than by the airy
decision of the Supreme Court.
When the Labor Board has branded the utterances of employ-
ers as unfair labor practices in violation of section 8 (1), there
seem to be two underlying theories in justification, used either
separately or concurrently. One theory, to be labelled the "con-
text" theory, is that words uttered in a context of violent or other
illegal acts, lose their identity as words, and may be treated with-
out regard to constitutional limitations as to freedom of speech.
The other theory, to be labelled the "inherent" theory, is that an
employer's utterances, in view of his economic relationship with
his employees, are inherently coercive.
Two Ford cases excellently illustrate the first or "context"
theory. In one case,29 a filling station manager across the street
from the plant gave permission to the union to exhibit a banner
announcing a meeting to be held by the union. Shortly there-
after, nine men emerged from the plant, one remarking, "What
in the hell are you guys pulling off?" and then tore the banner
to pieces; "service men" were also engaged in surveillance of
union meetings, and in threatening employees concerning their
union activities. In the other case,30 there was a circulation of a
'ote of Confidence" in company policies, and the publicizing of
the vote as a rejection of the union; and there were discharges
because of membership in, and activity or suspected activity for,
or sympathy toward, the union. In both cases, pamphlets with
an intense anti-union bias were distributed to employees. 31 More-
28. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40 (C. C. A. 4, 1936)
84 F. (2d) 641, aff'd (1937) 300 U. S. 515.
29. In the Matter of Ford Motor Co. (1940) 23 N. L. R. B. 548.
30. In the Matter of Ford Motor Co. (1939) 14 N. L. R. B. 346.
31. Pamphlet headed "FoRD Givn s VMWPOINT ON LAB0ro" and carried
caption "Ford * * * Cautions Workers on Organization." Typical state-
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over, in the latter case, the distribution of the literature was con-
ducted in such a manner as to impress it particularly upon the
recipients. Ordinarily, literature was merely placed in boxes,
with employees having the privilege of taking it; but here, ser-
vice men distributed the literature and made sure that each em-
ployee received it. If an employee didn't notice the literature, a
service man pulled him back and gave it to him; or the literature
was pushed into employees' hands as they emerged from the gate.
ments are the following: "A monopoly of jobs in this country is just as
bad as a monopoly of bread. Sometimes we catch people here in Detroit
'selling' jobs at the Ford Motor Co. by making ignorant persons believe
they have a 'pull' with us. * * * This was done by crooks and they were
properly dealt with. But, now along comes another group that says: 'There
are 100,000 jobs out at Ford's. If you want one of them, pay us a regis-
tration fee, and so much every month, and we will pass you in, and you
can work as long as you pay us.' This group is asking us to sit still while
it sells our men the jobs that have always been free. If we agreed to this,
they would have complete control of American labor, a control no one has
ever before had." "* * * What was the great result of those strikes?
Merely that numbers of men have put their neck into an iron collar. I
am only trying to show them who owns the collar. * * *" "* * * A little
group of those who control both capital and labor will sit down in New
York, and they will settle prices, and they will settle dividends, and they
will settle wages * * " "The Wagner Act is just one of those things
that helps to fasten control upon the necks of labor. Labor doesn't see
that yet. It thinks the Wagner Act helps it. All you have to do is to
wait and see how it works. It fits perfectly the plans to get control of
labor." "I have never sought to prevent our men from joining any asso-
ciation-religious, racial, political or social * * * No one who believes in
American freedom would do that. When our men ask about unions, I give
them the same advice as when they ask about any of the other schemes
that are always being aimed at men's wages. I say to them: 'First, figure
out for yourself what you are going to get out of it. If you go into a
union, they have got you, but what have you got?'" "We think our men
ought to consider whether it is necessary for them to pay some outsider
every month for the privilege of working at Ford's. Or, whether any union
can do more for them than we are doing. If union leaders think they can
manage an automobile factory better than we can, and pay better wages
under better working conditions than we can, why don't they build a fac-
tory of their own and show us up? They have the capital-they have all
the money they need and a lot more. The country is big; they have the
men; and think of all the union customers they would have!" "If the union
leaders are sincere, they should go into business themselves. If they have
thought out a better way to manage business, let them demonstrate what
it is. If they can't do that, why do they pretend they can? Of course, the
financial interests that use strikes as a way to build up unions, would not
permit them to build new factories-big, progressive factories with every-
thing in them that union leaders now demand. They don't want that. They
want control. I have always made a better bargain for our men than an
outsider could. We have never had to bargain against our men, and we
don't expect to begin now. There is no mystery about the connection be-
tween corporation control and labor control. They are simply the two ends
of the same rope. To have one, you have got to have the other. You may
say as emphatically as you like, that all this does not disturb me in the
least. I know the scheme is wrong, and it will not work."
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In these cases, it was stated that the issue was not whether
the expression of opinion by an employer calculated to influence
employees in derogation of their rights as guaranteed by the act,
was, as such, forbidden by the act. The issue was whether, under
the circumstances of the case, the employer in fact interfered
with the rights of the employees. And in the determination of
this question it was necessary to consider not only the bare words
of the literature, but also the accompanying events and back-
ground in which these words were set. Under the circumstances
of these cases, the Board found it impossible to believe that the
anti-union utterances were intended to influence only employees'
mental processes. The background of these utterances clearly
revealed a broad attack by the employer upon the union organi-
zation, and the publications, being merely a part of the illegal
attack, lost their identity as words and became instruments of
coercion not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.
In the words of the Board, "The guarantee of such rights to the
employees would indeed be wholly ineffective if the employer,
under the guise of exercising his constitutional right of free
speech were free to coerce them into refraining from exercising
the rights vouchsafed them in the act."32
The second, or "inherent" theory, under which restriction of
employers' utterances is justified, is not as clearly vindicated as
is the first. For this reason, the Board usually bases its decision
upon the first theory. Nevertheless, the Board has often gone on
record in the words of the "inherent" theory, even when relying
mainly upon the "context" theory.
Again, the Board's attitude in this connection can best be
illustrated by dictum in another Ford case. "Whether the words
or actions of an employer constitute interference, restraint, or
coercion, within the meaning of the act, must be judged not as
an abstract proposition, but in the light of the economic realities
of the employer-employee relationship.'3 3 In this case, the same
intensely anti-union pamphlets had been distributed as in the
other Ford cases. The employees, the Board found, could hardly
have misunderstood the import of these pamphlets; not only must
they have realized the company's uncompromising hostility to the
labor union but they must certainly have realized that measures
would be taken to make this opposition effective. In view of the
dominant position of the employer who possesses power of eco-
nomic life and death over the employee, these utterances, whether
32. In the Matter of Ford Motor Co. (1940) 19 N. L. R. B. 732.
33. In the Matter of Ford Motor Co. (1940) 23 N. L. R. B. 342.
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couched in terms of argument or advice or not, are given a
coercive effect which would not exist if these statements were
directed to economic equals.
In other words, here again the Board finds that the purpose
of the utterances of the employer is inconsistent with the purpose
of the doctrine of freedom of speech. By virtue of economic rela-
tionship with employees, the employer is almost inherently in-
capable of addressing to the intellect of his employees an argu-
ment which they are free to accept or reject without compulsion.
In such a situation there is no free trade in ideas in the com-
petition of the market. On the contrary, the utterances them-
selves serve as a warning that economic force will be used to
back up the opinion expressed.
Although, as illustrated by the Ford case, the Board has often
gone out of its way to announce the theory of "inherent coercive-
ness" while actually relying upon the "context theory,"83 there
have been cases wherein the Board sustained its decision on the
former theory. Thus it has been held to be an unfair labor
practice where an employer assembled employees and read a
statement purporting to inform them of their rights under the
National Labor Relations Act, but which statement the Board
found to be misleading ;85 where an employer questioned employ-
ees concerning the union, orally seeking to discredit union and
organizers ;3 and where the employer made speeches to employ-
ees, asserting that the union would do them no good.8 7 In none
of these cases was a background of violence, discrimination, or
company-unionism relied upon.
Armed with these two theories, the Board has brought many
different types of utterances within the interdict of the act. The
distribution of anti-union pamphlets has often been declared an
unfair labor practice.38 A great furor was created when the
board thus labeled the distribution of a pamphlet entitled "Com-
munism's Iron Grip on the C. I. 0." which consisted mainly of
quotations from a speech delivered by a Congressman in the
34. In the Matter of Harry Schwartz Yarn Co., Inc. (1939) 12 N. L.
P. B. 1139; In the Matter of North Electric Manufacturing Co. (1940)
24 N. L. I. B. No. 52; In the Matter of Walter Stover (1939) 15 N. L.
R. B. 635; In the Matter of Jahn & Ollier Engraving Co. (1940) 24 N. L.
R. B. No. 94.
35. In the Matter of Express Publishing Co. (1939) 13 N. L. R. B. 1213.
36. In the Matter of Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co. (1939) 16 N. L.
R. B. 501.
37. In the Matter of Lone Star Gas Co. (1939) 18 N. L. R. B. 420. In
this case, however, there was surveillance of union activity and discrimina-
tion subsequent to the talks.
38. See notes 39, 40, 42 infra.
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House' of Representatives.- In spite of the commotion occa-
sioned, the case was never appealed to the courts. In another
case,4 0 the Board objected not so much to the distribution or to
the contents of a pamphlet, as to the employer's statements ac-
companying the distribution.41 Usually, however, pamphlets have
been' objected to on the basis of their negative explanation or
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. Where em-
phasis is placed upon what the employees are not bound to do,
or upon what the act does not purport to do, as opposed to what
the employees may do or what the act does purport to do, the
distribution of the pamphlet is an unfair labor practice.42 Such
a pamphlet is held to distort the true significance of the act and
to mislead readers with respect to employees' rights under the
act. Pamphlets indulging in vilification of a union 43 and announc-
ing anti-union demonstrations 44 have also been held objectionable.
Threats by or on behalf of the employer obviously are not
countenanced. Statements threatening layoffs unless union activ-
ity ceases, 45 threatening that supervisory employee will not work
with union employees, 4 threatening to move the plant before
union recognition is given,47 and threatening to close the factory
if union activity does not cease4 8 are all held in violation of the
act.
However, subtler expressions than those contained in the bla-
tant propaganda leaflets or in the threats have been held to run
afoul of the act. For instance, assertions that the management
could do more for the employees than the union could and that
salaries would be increased without regard to the union were
said to imply that the employees would derive no benefits from
union affiliation, and the assertions therefore constituted inter-
39. In the Matter of the Muskin Shoe Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 1.
40. In the matter of Nebel Knitting Co., Inc. (1938) 6 N. L. R. B. 284.
41. "I do not deny that I am 100% against labor unions."
42. In the Matter of Jahn & Oilier Engraving Co. (1940) 24 N. L. R. B.
No. 94; In the Matter of Mock-Judson-Voehringer Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B.
133; In the Matter of Mansfield Mills, Inc. (1937) 3 N. L. R. B. 901.
43. In the Matter of Union Drawn Steel Company (1938) 10 N. L. R. B.
868.
44. In the Matter of Elbe File and Binder Company, Inc. (1937) 2 N. L.
R. B. 906.
45. In the Matter of Walter Stover (1939) 15 N. L. R. B. 635; In the
Matter of the North Electric Manufacturing Co. (1940) 24 N. L. R. B.
No. 52.
46. In the Matter of Virginia Ferry Corp. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 730.
47. In the Matter of California Cotton Oil Corp. (1940) 20 N. L. R. B.
540.
48. In the Matter of Semet-Solvay Co. (1938) 7 N. L. R. B. 511; In
the Matter of Cowell Portland Cement Co. (1938) 8 N. L. B. B. 1020; In
the Matter of Trenton Garment Co. (1938) 4 N. L. R. 3. 1186.
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ference, restraint, and coercion.4 9 An appeal to the "conscience
and self-respect" of an employee, by asking "What would the
old man think of you?" and advice to an employee to consider his
family were similarly illegal 0 Interrogating employees concern-
ing their union membership was unlawful interference, for it
constituted an implied threat that the employer's economic power
might be used to the disadvantage of employees active in the
union.5' Questioning employees concerning their grievances
after the advent of a union was illegally coercive, for it gave rise
to the implication that the employees might secure redress of
their grievances without the union.5 2 Moreover, it has been held
that the response of an employer to a question asked by employ-
ees, to the effect that he advised them against an outside union,
constituted an unfair labor practice. 8 The offer of collective
bargaining with an unaffiliated committee of the respondent's
employees was illegal interference, for it was prejudicial to an
independent union.5 ' The subtlest instance of interference, re-
straint, and coercion, however, was the giving of currency by
a supervisory employee to a false rumor concerning the union,
which the Board found to have interfered with the free choice
of the employees at an election.55
49. In the Matter of Knoxville Publishing Co. (1939) 12 N. L. R. B.
1209.
50. In the Matter of the A. S. Abell Co. (1938) 5 N. L. R. B. 644.
51. In the Matter of Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co. (1939) 16 N. L.
R. B. 501; In the Matter of Harry Schwartz Yarn Co. (1939) 12 N. L. R. B.
1139; In the Matter of Boss Manufacturing Company (1937) 3 N. L. R. B.
400; In the Matter of Foote Brothers Gear and Machine Corp. (1939) 14
N. L. R. B. 1045.
52. In the Matter of The Dow Chemical Co. (1939) 13 N. L. R. B. 993.
53. In the Matter of Brown Shoe Company, Inc. (1940) 22 N. L. R. B.
1080.
54. In the Matter of American Manufacturing Co. (1938) 5 N. L. B. B.
443; In the Matter of David E. Kennedy, Inc. (1938) 6 N. L. R. B. 699.
55. In the Matter of Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co. (1939) 10 N. L.
R. B. 1821. Many of the coercive statements attributed to the employer
were actually made by a supervisory employee. The employer is not re-
sponsible for the statements of every supervisory employee, however. A
"straw boss" type of foreman, who acts only in advisory capacities as to
lay-offs and hirings and often is not consulted at all, and who is himself
eligible to membership in the union, does not by his statements make the
company responsible. In the Matter of Ford Motor Co. (1939) 18 N. I.
R. B. No. 167. But when the foreman is more than a "straw boss" and
is actually the workers' first contact with the management, the rule is
otherwise. In the Matter of Ford Motor Co. (1940) 23 N. L. R. B. 342;
In the Matter of the Serrick Corp. (1938) 8 N. L. B. B. 621. Such foremen
are generally relied upon for information concerning the work of men
under them and consulted at the time of selection of men for lay-off and
re-employment; their recommendations are usually followed; and even
though their wages are only slightly higher than those of the ordinary
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3. COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBLEM
An analysis of the attitude of an administrative board toward
the object of its administration is, of course, incomplete without
an accompanying analysis of the extent to which policy of the
administrative body has been sanctioned by the courts. The atti-
tude of the courts toward the problem at hand is now settled.
In the first place, the "context theory" is as well accepted by the
courts as it is by the Board.- The underlying idea in the judicial
enforcement of this theory is the opinion by Justice Holmes in
Aikens v. State of Wisconsin:57
No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify
all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The most
innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions
may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step
in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is suffi-
cient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law.
employees, their statements are attributable to the employer. It is not
necessary, to hold the employer responsible for their statements, that these
employees have the power to hire and fire. In the Matter of Ford Motor
Co. (1940) 23 N. L. R. B. 548. All that is necessary is that the employee
should exercise substantial employer functions. In the Matter of Ford
Motor Co. (1940) 23 N. L. R. B. 342.
The extent to which an employer is held responsible by the courts for
the statements of supervisory employees is, in general, quite similar to the
extent to which the employer is held responsible by the Board. It has been
held that the power to hire and fire must belong to the supervisory employee.
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 98 F.(2d) 758. However, most of the cases make no such requirement. If an
employee is so closely connected with the management that his suggestion
for employment or discharge is practically as potent as the power to hire
and fire, his statements are attributable to the employer. International Ass'n
of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers v. N. L. R. B. (App. D. C. 1939) 110 F.(2d) 29. Even this requirement is among the more stringent ones. The em-
ployer may be held on the doctrine of respondent superior. Swift & Co. v.
N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 10, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 87. And although it has been
held that statements of supervisory employees are not attributable to the em-
ployer unless made within the scope of actual, implied, or apparent author-
ity (Cupples Co. Manufacturers v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 106 F.
(2d) 100.), the Supreme Court has held that the question is not one of
legal liability on principles of agency. H. J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B.
(1941) 311 U. S. 514. Rather it is a question of whether the employer
gains from the statements any advantage in the bargaining process which
the act proscribes. Such advantage would be gained when the utterances of
the supervisory employees take place under circumstances which make obvi-
ous the fact that the policy of the employer is being expressed. N. L. R. B.
v. Whittier Mills Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 474; N. L. R. B. v.
Swank Products (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 872; Humble Oil & Refin-
ing Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 85.
56. N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 344.
57. (1904) 195 U. S. 194; see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.(1941) 312 U. S. 287.
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Thus, if an utterance is but a step in an illegal anti-union plot,
it may not claim the privilege of free speech. Indeed, it may
not even claim to be speech at all, since it merges into the plot,
and is not distinguishable from it.
The illegal anti-union plot which serves as a background for
the utterance may consist of discriminatory discharges of em-
ployees for union activities,58 industrial espionage,59 support of
a company or "inside" union, 60 intimidation and violence,61 spon-
soring of an anti-union mass-meeting,62 influencing employee elec-
tions, 68 or surveillance of union meetings and activities.
6 4
The utterance appearing in such a background need not be
violently anti-union. As said by the court in National Labor
Relations Board v. Link Belt Co.,65 "The fact that these various
forces at work were subtle rather than direct does not mean that
they were none the less effective. Intimidations of an employer's
preference, though subtle, may be as potent as outright threats
of discharge." A statement that "You are under no obligation
to join any union and cannot be forced to do so, as this tannery
will always operate as an open shop. This Company will deal
individually with any employee that wishes to do so at any
time," was held to be coercive. And similarly, a sample ballot
58. Continental Box Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 113 F.
(2d) 93; International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers v. N. L.
R. B. (1940) 311 U. S. 72; N. L. R. B. v. Colten (C. C. A. 6, 1939) 105
F. (2d) 179; N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 96 F.
(2d) 193; N. L. R. B. v. Viking Pump Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
759; N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 3, 1940) 114 F.
(2d) 221; N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co. (1941) 311 U. S. 584.
59. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. R. (1938) 305 U. S. 197; N. L.
R. B. v. Link-Belt Co. (1941) 311 U. S. 584, Continental Box Co., Inc. v.
N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 93; Republic Steel Corp. v.
N. L. . B. (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 472.
60. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1938) 305 U. S. 197; N. L.
R. B. v. Link-Belt Co. (1941) 311 U. S. 584; N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Min-
ing Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 780; N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather
Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 3, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 221.
61. Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
472; N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 110 F. (2d)
780.
62. N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 110 F. (2d)
780.
63. Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
472; N. L. R. B. v. Colten (C. C. A. 6, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 179.
64. Republic Steel v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 472.
Of course, the illegal anti-union acts mentioned in this and preceding foot-
notes have not occurred in the cases as isolated from other illegal anti-
union acts. There are usually many such acts within each case, and con-
sequently, it is difficult to tell for certain what the effect of one act in
isolation would be.
65. (1941) 311 U. S. 584, 589.
66. N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 3, 1940) 114 F.(2d) 221, 223.
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phrased in such a manner as to suggest adverse criticism of the
union, with the plain implication that a certain vote was desired,
was held to be violative of section 8.11
Most of the objectionable statements, however, have been in
the nature of threats, or clearly implied threats: "This Union
business has got to-has gone far enough * * * he [president] is
going to close the shop down if this Union business contin-
ues * * * ;"68 "To hell with C. I. 0. ;,,69 "Republic stands for the
'Open Shop Principle.' Every Republic Employee owes a duty
of loyalty to the Company so that its best interests may be served.
Conduct detrimental to the interests of the Company and which
may disrupt the satisfactory relations between employees and
management will not be tolerated ;,,7o "C. I. 0. is a racket con-
ducted by racketeers."7 1
The issue of inherent coerciveness was resolved against the
Board by the Supreme Court in the recent case of National Labor
Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Company7 2 In a
none too scholarly opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy said that "If the
utterances are thus to be separated from their background, we
find it difficult to sustain a finding of coercion with respect to
them alone." The whole complex problem of inherent coercive-
ness of speech was dismissed with the curt statement that "Per-
haps the purport of these utterances may be altered by im-
ponderable subtleties at work which it is not our function to
appraise."78 The court also made it clear that it was not the
Board's function to appraise such "subtleties" either, for the
Board was overruled for attempting to make the appraisal. Such
"imponderable subtleties," therefore, are beyond the pale of the
law. This confession of legal impotence is not rendered any more
satisfactory by its manner, that is, without citation of authority
or discussion of the principles involved. The opinion overlooked
all of the litigation in point which has occurred in the circuit
courts of appeals, in such a manner as to dismiss it as of no
importance whatever. It will therefore be interesting, even at
the risk of being overly academic, to examine into the back-
67. N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 110 F. (2d)
780.
68. N. L. R. B. v. Viking Pump Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
759, 760.
69. N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co. (1941) 311 U. S. 584, 593.
70. Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
472, 474.
71. N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 110 F. (2d)
780, 787.
72. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 344.
73. Id. at 349.
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ground of the issue, which Mr. Justice Murphy saw fit to omit
entirely.
The weight of authority in the circuit courts of appeals is in
accord with the conclusion announced by the Supreme Court.
An employer who volunteered that he would advise his son
against joining a union was held not to be exercising coercion.7 4
The reasoning of the court was that "it is difficult to think" that
Congress intended to prevent an employer from expressing such
an opinion. Having found it difficult to think, the court did not
exert itself unduly in that direction. One court stated that the
management did not coerce or intimidate its employees respect-
ing their union activities where an employer asked an employee
if he belonged to the union or knew anything about it.75 Pre-
sumably, that statement is the basis of the decision. Where
an employer in response to a question asking advice, replied that
his preference was for a local over an outside union, the court
disagreed with the Board that there was a violation of the em-
ployees' rights, but seemed to do so with considerable misgivings,
for the reasoning was devoted to a justification of a decision
the other way, had the court felt so inclined.7 6 In these words
the court revealed its doubt as to the wisdom of its own deci-
sion :7
* * * the voice of authority may, by tone inflection, as
well as by the substance of the words uttered, provoke fear
and awe quite as readily as it may bespeak fatherly advice.
The position of the employer where, as here, there is present
genuine and sincere respect and regard, carries such weight
and influence that his words may be coercive when they
would not be so if the relation of master and servant did
not exist.
But the court which decided that an employer who volunteered
that he should prefer one union over another was within his
rights, had no such doubts, dismissing his statement as not
amounting to a scintilla when considered in the light of his previ-
ous conduct in connection with union activities.78 Where the
utterance was made by a policy-making officer of the employer,
the court held that the employer was not to be held responsible
for an "isolated" utterance, in the absence of evidence of any
74. N. L. R. B. v. Union Pae. Stages (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 153.
75. Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 7, 1940)
114 F. (2d) 611.
76. N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 383.
77. Id. at 389.
78. N. L. R. B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co. (1938) 306 U. S. 332.
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policy of proscribed discrimination. 9 This decision seems to give
rise to the implication that utterances made by the employer him-
self might possibly be considered a violation of the act, even
though the background were lacking. In another case overruling
the Board, the court made some effort to justify its decision on
the basis that the utterances in fact did not interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in their rights under the act. 0 The
,only possible conclusions from this decision are (1) that the court
trespassed on the domain of the Board in fact finding, or (2)
that it ruled as a matter of law that the statements could not be
coercive. Neither conclusion speaks kindly for the decision, the
former being clearly error, and the latter being evidence of
nuddled expression. A case affirming the employer's right to
suggest retention of individual bargaining rests upon the pro-
found basis that such suggestion is all right as long as it is not
coercion.8 ' Similarly, another case, with reference to a 9tate-
ment of open shop policy, held that the statement alone was no
evidence that the employer was undertaking to interfere with or
dominate his employees. 2
All that the statute prohibits is domination, interference,
and support. The employer has the right to have and to ex-
press a preference for one union over another so long as that
expression of opinion is in the exercise of free speech and is
not the use of economic power to coerce, compel or buy the
support of the employees for or against a particular labor
organization.
This statement obviously begs the question, for the very issue is
whether or not the speech is the use of economic power to coerce.
In order to qualify for the protection announced by the courts
in the cases just discussed, the utterance need not be as mild as
the utterances were in those cases,83 nor in fact, need there even
be a complete absence of discriminatory background. 84 In N. L.
R. B. v. Ford Motor Co.,O where the statements concerned were
79. Martel Mills Corp. v. N. L. I. B. (C. C. A. 4, 1940) 114 F. (2d)
624; N. L. R. B. v. Mathieson Alkali Works (C. C. A. 4, 1940) 114 F. (2d)
796; N. L. R. B. v. Sparks-Withington Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 119 F. (2d)
78.
80. Press Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (App. D. C. 1940) 118 F. (2d) 937.
81. Midland Steel Products Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C C. A. 6, 1940) 113 F.
(2d) 800.
82. Continental Box Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 113 F.
(2d) 93, 97.
83. But see Note, Recent Limitations on Free Speech (1938) 48 Yale
L. J. 54, 72.
84. N. L. R. B. v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905.
85. Id. at 915.
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contained in the pamphlet already described,86 the court held that
it was not enough to set the publication condemned against a
background of alleged discriminatory discharges of 24 employees
out of a total of 80,000 men. In this same case87 it was said
that "If the concept that an employer's opinion of labor organi-
zations and organizers must, because of the authority of master
over servant, nearly always prove coercive, it is difficult now to
say, in view of the National Labor Relations Act, its adjudication
as constitutionally valid, its strict enforcement by the National
Labor Relations Board, and the liberal attitude of the courts in
construing it so as best to effectuate its great social and economic
purpose, that the concept is still a sound one." And then the
court blandly stated that "The servant no longer has occasion
to fear the master's frown of authority or threats of discrimina-
tion for union activities, express or implied." This profound
observation was made after the court had described in some de-
tail a violent and unprovoked assault on union handbill distribu-
tors, mostly women, by company "service men" and after the
court had found the company responsible for such conduct. To
say the least, the court's attitude here is not unduly realistic.
On the other hand there have been some expressions of sym-
pathy by the circuit courts of appeals for the idea of inherent
coerciveness of speech. The dictum in the Falk8 case has already
been quoted.89 In National Labor Relations Board v. Prince" the
court seemed concerned over the problem and discussed it at
length, but could not bring itself to decide that the mere dis-
tribution of propaganda by the employer constituted interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion, although the court indicated that
it thought so. The decision, however, was placed on another
ground.
But there are cases which bear on the issue by way of deci-
sion, and not merely dictum. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board,91 there was a background to
justify the decision on the "context theory," but the court did not
in any way connect that background with the speech, thus giving
rise to the implication that it might not be necessary. In Virginia
86. See note 31, supra.
87. Id. at 914.
88. N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 383, 389.
See note 84, supra.
89. See note 77, supra.
90. N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 1, 1941) 118 F.(2d) 874.
91. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 107
F. (2d) 555.
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Perry Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board , 92 there was like-
wise a background of discriminatory discharges, but the court in
its decision did not even mention them. The decision was con-
cerned only with the speech complained of. In another case,a
the court held that a statement of open shop policy was designed
to discourage organizational efforts, and held it to be an unfair
labor practice, without discussion, although it could have relied,
had it cared to, upon an illegal anti-union background.
Two recent cases in circuit courts of appeals, however, pre-
sented the issue squarely, and the courts met the issue squarely,
seemingly without hesitation. In one of the cases9" a superin-
tendant made statements "from which the men might fairly infer
that it was not to their interest to become members of the union
and that they might suffer from such an association." This was
held to be ample basis for the order of the Board directing the
employer to cease and desist from interfering with his employees
in the exercise of their guaranteed rights. And in the second
case, 95 the opinion is a beautiful exposition of the theory of inher-
ent coerciveness of an employer's utterances. "Language may
serve to enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays the speaker's
feelings and desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree
clouded if the hearer is in his power." And again, the court said,
"Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only
communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each inter-
penetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport
from the setting in which they are used, of which the relation
between speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important
part.. What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous
presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifes-
tation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart. The
Board must decide how far the second aspect obliterates the
first." 96
However, the opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy, which is the
law, says that the Board may make no such decision, for it would
involve the consideration of "imponderable subtleties." Thus is
dismissed the statement in the Link Belt 97 case that "The fact
92. Virginia Ferry Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 4, 1939) 101 F. (2d)
103.
93. N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 3, 1940) 114 F.
(2d) 221.
94. N. L. R. B. v. A. S. Abell Co. (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 951, 956.
95. N. L. R. B. v. Federbush Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 121 F. (2d>
954, 957.
96. Ibid.
97. (1941) 311 U. S. 584.
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that these various forces * * * were subtle rather than direct
does not mean that they were none the less effective. Intima-
tions of an employer's preference, though subtle, may be as
potent as outright threats of discharge." One would be much
more satisfied with Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion if he had seen
fit to give a little attention to the merits of the issue before
stating his conclusion. It is to be hoped that ultimately the
Supreme Court will give the question more adequate considera-
tion.
4. CONCLUSION
The real problem of this discussion has been how far employ-
ers may go with their utterances in an attempt to emasculate the
policy of Congress with respect to guaranties to labor. But the
policy of Congress is subservient to the Constitution; if the policy
is contrary to the Constitution, it cannot be upheld. Moreover,
since a statute involving civil liberties is in question, the burden
of proof as to constitutionality lies with the proponents of the
statute and its policy, there being no presumption of constitu-
tionality.98
An analogous situation is seen in connection with the criminal
law. Holmes' statement that if the most innocent and constitu-
tionally protected of acts is a step in a criminal plot, neither its
innocence nor the Constitution will prevent punishment of the
plot by law,99 actually begs the ultimate question. Merely de-
claring an act to be a crime does not solve the problem,100 for
Congress's ability to declare acts to be crimes is subject to con-
stitutional limitation. For instance, Congress may declare an
act to be a crime, which is effected by means of words: incite-
ment to riot. This law limits absolute freedom of speech. Thus
it is seen that two interests must be weighed in the balance: the
interest of freedom of speech and the interest of the public wel-
fare. Obviously there is no logical mathematical solution. The
solution must be a subjective, intuitive one. The example pre-
sented is not very difficult. With the crime of sedition, there is
more difficulty. And when we leave the field of criminal law
altogether, there is yet more difficulty.
Therefore, the solution of the problem presently being dis-
cussed is found in a subjective balance of interests. The answer
depends largely upon who does the balancing. Factors to be
98. Schneider v. State (1939) 308 U. S. 147. Noted (1940) 40 Colum.
L. Rev. 531.
99. Aikens v. State of Wisconsin (1904) 195 U. S. 194.
100. Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 14.
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taken into consideration are the degree or amount of suppres-
sion and the importance of the policy to be effected. It is the
writer's opinion that the policy to be effected by the National
Labor Relations Act is sufficiently important and the degree of
suppression of speech involved is sufficiently small in most cases,
that the policy of the act tilts the scale in its favor.
With respect to utterances with an illegal-anti-union back-
ground, there is no disagreement. Both the Board and the courts
hold that such utterances do not receive the protection of the
First Amendment. The difficulty has been with cases having no
discernible background of the proscribed type. But, in the first
place, there are relatively few cases of this nature in the books.
And in the second place, there are likely to be in the future very
few cases of this nature, in view of experience with what the
factual situations have been in the past. Nevertheless, where
the expression does appear as an isolated fact, it seems that,
with one significant qualification, the theory of inherent coercive-
ness of the expression should be followed. That qualification is
in the addition of the word "may." An employer's utterance =V/
inherently interfere with the rights of the employees as guar-
anteed by the act. The "may" is inserted as qualifying the legal
effect of the utterance, not its logical effect. For there may con-
ceivably be times when an utterance, although in strictest logic
it does interfere, should not be allowed to have that legal effect.
In such situations, whether or not to proscribe the speech is
determined, as indicated, by the process of balancing interests.
For instance, legitimate criticism by an employer of union poli-
cies, made in good faith and without actual intent to coerce his
employees, might be allowed on the ground that to hold other-
wise would place organized labor beyond criticism by employers,
and that this result is less desirable than allowing the slight
actual coercion which would logically result. Admittedly, a deter-
mination under this concept would be difficult. But the law has
never shied from application of vague rules. Moreover, the great
majority of cases, as previously indicated, are clear-cut. Usu-
ally there is no question as to what purpose is served by a par-
ticular utterance. And in the relatively few cases where circum-
stances are such that the coercive element is not obvious, the
employer being in good faith, discretion may be allowed for the
purpose of deciding the issue on the basis of a balance of in-
terests.
Such an interpretation of the problem is not open to the
objection that we are allowing an entering wedge into the sacred
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chamber of our civil liberties. There is no entering wedge, be-
cause the problem is being solved without revolutionary princi-
ples, but in a time-honored fashion. And to those who object to
the direction in which the scales tip, it is submitted as an ulti-
mate conclusion that under this interpretation of the problem,
employers would not be denied freedom of speech at all. They
would not be denied the right to address arguments to the intel-
lect of their employees in the hope that these arguments might
be accepted voluntarily; they would be denied the privilege of
coercing their employees by means of an act effected by means
of words. Free speech is strictly an intellectual instrument. The
rights of labor cannot be nullified by any intellectual influence.
Therefore, utterances which do tend to nullify them, are not in
the exercise of intellectual influence, and do not come within the
protection of the First Amendment. A more careful considera-
tion of the definition of free speech in terms of intellectual com-
merce, in the final analysis, would simplify the problem.
MYRON GOLLUB.
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